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economic realiry of globalised sport (the business of sports evenr
organisation, which had become highly competitive due to the infation
in television rights following the appeerance of subscription television
networks) was growin& and public incomprehension and distrust of
professional sports leagues and private event organisers remains sûong,
especially in Europe. This moral crisis has led to a degree of disaffec-
tion with sport that has been strengthened by revelations of corruption
at the highest levels of the IOC and international federarions, and by
sportt seeming inability to effectively combat doping and match foing.
The Festina affair in 1998 destroyed the credibility of cycling while rhe
Salt Lake Ciry scandal in t999 had a similar impact on the IOC-new
means of communication such as the Internet have not only enabled
major sports events to grow massively around the world, they have aiso
made consumers less naïie. The crisis in sportb governânce geme ro
a head in 2015, when an investigation led by the us Department of
Justice found enough evidence of corrupdon wirhin FIFA, the world's
largest sport federation, ro topple many of the federation's top execu-
tives, including its once all-powerfirl and untouchable president, Sepp
Blatter. A few months after FIFAgate, allegations that members of
the IAAF solicited bribes in order to correr up widespread doping by
Russian athletes resulted in the fall from grace of anorher of sport! most
powerful executives, the IAAF's Senegalese president, Lamine Diack.
As the first African to preside a major international sporrs federation,
Diack was the pride of African sport. Nevertheless, the Russian doping
correr up, in which Diack's son was also implicated, brought an end ro
Diack's \5-year reign.
Sport's governing bodies have attempted in vain to srâmp out mis-
conduct and thereby avoid policing actions by the European Union
and individual countries, especially the United Srates, whose jusdce
department has been particularly active in pursuing cheats and mafias,
However, regulatory bodies created within the world of sport, such as
the's?'orld Anti-Doping Agen.y (\7ADA) and the court of Arbitration
for sport (cAS), have shown their limirs, and there is little evidence as
yet that sport will be able ro pur its own house in order. Consequendy,
\ /e are in the heart of rhe storm and a new form of governance is being
developed under our very eyes.
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Hein Verbruggen: Bringing a Corporate
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Hei a true politician, patient if necessary but ako almost brutar if necessary
[free translation from French]. (Jean-Marie Leblanc, for-"r Tour de
France Director)l
There are uery good and. professional people in the international sportfedzra-
tions. But ifyu looh at the structure and. organisation of them it simpry carc-
not be good. (Hein Verbruggen, November 2014)
The link benareen international sport federations (IFs) and business is
etill a recent phenomenon, a randem of mutual beneût that has evolved
cver the last three decades. Before this, by their very nârure, IFs with
tfieir social mission and business as an economic activiry constitured
two completely distinct worlds. The former promoting, above all,
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pastimes and a forum for socid encounrers; the lamer being profit-
and outcome-oriented, optimised by strategic planning, performanæ
manâgement and qualiry controls. '$7ith increasing public interesr in
sport specteting (Robinson 2003) and the explosion of broadcasting
rights in the 1990s, the worlds of sport and business began ro conyerge
under the doctrine of performance and effectiveness (Barbusse 200i),
Through the merging of the traditionally diverging logics of non-profit
sport organisations and business corporations, IFs have become hybrid
constructs (B"yl" et aI. 2011). These transformarions have introduced
a new group of actors: sport mânâgers. For these actors, the business
world, with its rules, constraints and expectations, has become the point
of reference (Barbusse 2002). For uansformarions to take place, it is
indispensable to have people who envisage, introduce and lead change
(Amis et el. 2004). Hein Verbruggen wâs such a person.
A businessman ar heart and by conviction, Hein Verbruggen brought
new perspectives into the world of cycling and international sport. His
leadership, pragmatic marketing and management epproach, which
have profoundly shaped international cycling and the ùnion cycliste
Internationde (ucl) as its international governing body, were not
without controversy. some describe Hein verbruggen as a person with
"altliortunistic behaaiour and decisions driuen b1t mone/' (former presi-
dent of a national cycling federation) having an " ouersized ego" (formet
UCI staffmember), and allegations from riders (e.g. Floyd Landis, paul
Kimmage), the media (e.g. BBC) and a repom commissioned by the
UCI publicly accused Hein Verbruggen of wrongdoings.
A chapter about Hein verbruggen could tell many differenr srories:
the story of the visionary UCI President; the story of an IOC mem-
ber and President of sportAccord; or rhe story of Hein verbruggen as a
highly controversial figure in cycling who was confronted by allegations
of compliciry and laxity in the fight against doping. Rather than sketch-
ing a complete picture of Hein verbruggen as e person, this chapter
seeks to outline his main influences on the international sporting wàdd
through interviews with him and by impartially gathering impressions.from former employees, contemporary witnesses and ,"l.rr"rrt do"u-
ments (e.g. newspaper articles, reports). In particular it focuses on two
developments on which Hein verbruggen had a significanr influence:
the professionalisation of srrucrures and processes ar the ucl by apply-
ing corporare management knowleds. *d practices; and the trans-
formation of GAISF (General Association of International Sports
Federations, renamed sportAccord berween March 2009 and Àpril
2017) n become a service provider to IFs and a multi-sport games
organiser. This chapter is rhe story of Hein verbruggen's srrong belief
in, and reliance on, corporâte management principlÀ. It i, the story of
how he introduced these principles to sport, adapæd them to its realiry
and how these principles have left a legacy in the world of international
sport. It is also the story of the ambivalent spirit of IFs since rhe 1990s:
on the one hand, there are all-powerfirl presidents, a lack of transpar-
e1cy, 
_doping and corruption scandals and waning credibiliry; on the
other hand, major sport even6 bring together thousands of people from
all over the world and evenr revenues allow IFs ro finance j*"iop-"r*
projects.
. 
The chapter will focus on Hein verbrugen the marketing expert and
his entry into the world of sports, his mÀagerial vision r^J" Ë,r.ir.rr-
man and its implementarion at the ucl and his reform of GAISF to
become a service provider to IFs and a multi-sporr games organiser. As
a Person who strongly divides opinion, a short overview of some of rhe
allegations against him is also given. The chapter concludes with a sum-
mary of Hein verbruggen's main achievements. Information is based on
ten interviews-three of which were with Hein verbruggen and seven
with former employees and contemporary wi1ng5s6s-as well as ne\rys-
paper articles and a data analysis of loc, ucl and GAISF documents.
The lVlarketing Expert Who Became a Key
Leader in lnternational Sport
Bom on June 2I, l94l in Helmond, a city in the province of North
Brabant (Netherlands), Hein Verbruggen geu/ up in a region where
-cycling and enthusiasm for cycling have a long tradition. Fio*.v"r, he
had very litde to do with cycling 1n his younger years, besides perhaps
occasions on which his father took him ro vrarch a local cycling race.
Education was highly valued in the verbruggen f"*ily. Hein verbrugen
completed his studies at the Nijenrode Business School in 1964 and
started his first job as Regional Sales Manaçr for Camation Belgium
the same year, where he "receiued a uery good training in sales" (HV, April
2015).Following this first professional experience at Carnation (1964-
1968), Verbrugen's move to MEcMiMars was, above all, motivated by his
desire to enter the marketing sector. He was hired as a Product Manaçr
(1969), a job that had a significânt impact on his later philosophy and
vision. From the age of 28, his understanding of business, marketing,
management and strategic planning was largely formed during his years
with M&M/Mars, a company he described asuone of the be* companies in
the uorlà' (Ffl November 2014). M*y of the skills he acquired during
this time served him well when occupying pivotal positions in the world
of sports. His suong identification with the Mars principles of "qaality
regonsibility, ethics and eficienqf' (HV, April 2015) became his point of
reference. But how did Hein Verbruggen get into the world of cycling, a
world that, at that time, was still the reserve of individuals closely involvod
with cycling and/or who had an emotional aftachment to the sport?
The Mars-FIandria Sponsorship Deal
At first sight, Hein Verbruggen's entry into the world of sport could
be considered as a mere coincidence: looking for new possibilities to
advertise M&M/Mars' products in a fast-growing international food
market, the young sales manager convinced his employer to sponsor â
cycling team, proving a subtle instinct for business, strategic alliances
and marketing opportunities. Firstly, sport creates emotional links and
can improve the image of a product by simple association with
emotional experience of the sport, en event, athletes, etc.
in the 1970s and 1980s, sport \/es discovered to be an ideal
to promote products. It became a new advertising tool, marking
beginnings of sport sponsorship. And thirdly, the particular
stances of the law in Belgium made sport events and
ideal partners for the advertising industry: in the 1970s,
wes one of few countries (along with Scandinavia) where
advertising was banned on radio and television. \êrbruggen
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two-year sponsorship contract with a Belgium cycling team in 1970(Mars- Flandria) Sponsorship from outside the world of cycling was stillrelatively new et this time. Until the mid* 1950s, sponsorship and theorganisation of rycle races were strictly limited to cycling manufactur-
ers and ne\Mspapers. However, with the increasing populariry of cycling
events and the professionalisation of athletes, bicycle manufacturers
were unable to finance the sport alone. In L954, Italian ryclist FiorenzoMagni became blem of this change in rycling: his bike company,an emGdnna, was unable to conrinue financing his team. Magni turned ro theGerman cosmetic company Nivea and signed a conffacr with them asteam title sponsor. For the first time in rycling history, a brand outsidethe world of cycling became the sponsor of a rycling ream.2persuaded by one of the Mars-Flandria riders, Hein\èrbruggen became actively involved in cycling as a member of theprofessional rycling committee of the Royal Dutch Cycling Union(KNV.U) From this tlme on, he began to shape the sport from theinside. Just four years later, in 1979, he became a board member ofFédérarion Internationale de Cyclisme Professionnel (FICp), thenVice-President of FICp in 1 982 and President in l984.In l99l he was
elected President of the UCI. Verbruggen's career path illustrates how
rapidly he grew into the role of a major actor in internarional cycling
and in sporr in general. This chapter studies the following contributions
ofVerbruggen:
fessionalisation
his pragmatic management approach triggering the pro-
of the UCI and the creadon ofa support base for all IFsthe Olympic movement rhrough the services provided by GAISF.
In 1975,
gmatic Management Approach: Theple of the UCt
If you look around in the world, for me the bes
on fir,d i' i",h.;;ii.,"rior,rtr. (HV Novemo:ffiffi;-'nt svstem vou
Verbruggen wâs ar the head of the UCI for 14 years. When
President in 1991, the Geneva-based UCI headquaners (trans-
Paris ro Geneva in 1969) consisted of rwo people: a polisha ne\ry' door for M&M/Mars to promote their products by signing
General aged79 and his assistant. rVhen Hein Verbruggen left
the UCI in 2005, the federation employed 55 staff members, had irs
headquarters in a new velodrome in Aigle and enjoyed a stable finan-
cial andpatrimonial situation: "I taoÉ up a bankraptfedzration and when
I lef rhere Luere A cycling centre, all paid for and 14 millions ICHFI of
reserues," (HV November 2014). Hein Verbruggen has shaped interna-
tional cycling in many ways. The focus will, however, be limited ro rwo
particular achievements that ref.ect his managernent style, his fine sense
of policy and his relendess pursuit of improved organisationd perfor-
mance. The first of these achievemenrs was the dissolution of the FICP
and the Fédération Internationale Amareur de cyclisme (FIAC), finally
conferring the UCI with the role of the sole international representative
for the governânce, promotion and development of cycling worldwide.
The second achievement was the creation of the ubl prorour, now
known as the UCI \TorldTour.
Reversing the Effects of the Amateur Code
As a member of the Dutch national cycling federation since L975,
Hein verbruggen first participated in a FICP/FIAC congress in r97B(Munich). He immediately presented himself as candidate for one
of three vacant FICP posts and was elected at the following FICp
congress held in Maastricht on 20 August 1979. lF'is election allowed
him to attend rhe UCI Congress (Geneva, 30 November lg79). Vhen
verbruggen was elected to the board of the Luxembourg-based FICp in
1979, there was still a long \Mây ro go before the FICp and the FIAC
would be dissolved. Both federations were formally under the direction
of the ucl but in realiry rhe ucl had no influence. A closer look at
the historical evolution of the olympic Games is required to under-
qand why the UCI, as tÀe international governing body of rycling, was
flanked by mo additional international federations-FlCp and rttc-
ofwhich only the FIAC was recognised by the IOC.
the 1964 amareur code excluded from the Olympic Games those
athletes:
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who have participated fo1 monqy, or who have converted prizes intomoney or' widrout oermission of rh. National Federation within theRules of the Intrrn"tionar Federart;; ;;;:;;"ed, have received Drizesexceeding 50 Doilars in value, *d ,h;;;-;;;;";';*'.'#.i.i.1"r.
which can be converted into money;r;;-h* *"r.ri"t advantages.3
rn 7965' the Ioc under the presidency ofAvery Brundage obriged boththe ucl and FIFA to sprit i"ro .-lL', and professioiar branches, aæparation that other.IF"T{ 
^ln_^dy.rri"rr"k rr. As stated in the min_utes of the 63rd meeting of the roif ifil , *the r.o.c. dzcided to elimi_rwte the sports whose rederatnls s!r"À lrittn"or ,port où- o*o, ,ponat the sarne ilme".4 À 
" 
r.r,rlt, ilr. Uéf Ëstablished the amareur associa-tion FIAC and the orofessional *r*Li." FIC' It was nor unt' rg*lthat the re-admissioir of p.of"rrio.rJ;;hr.;., to the orympic Games wasaccepted by the IOC Congress (Baden-B"d.rr, G;;;i:;;ô84, theOlympic Games *.r. .ff..ii.,r.ly ;Ë;;ofessional athletes.However, having conceded io .t. pro'r*. of the IOC, the UCI wascaught in the crossfire of two rirrd'feJ.rations for the next 27 years.
Ï:,USlYanagement Committee **prir.a 50olo FIAC members and5090 FICP members. The two-broc 
"rrlg.-.rt was symbolic of thetime: while communisr counffies fro* th" Eastern bloc dominated theFIAC, the FICp was $a11ense! by a caprtali* *irrd*. .:frÇrnAgrhry{ACl :n;a we [FICpJ,yt(y..0, arli,rrryiiong we sai.d, thqr said no,. (HVNovember 2014).In this 50150 d."doJk, the ucl president could steera vote in one or other direction by his casting vote. h also meant thatdecisions supported uy ûr yajoriry wer. *. iiris situation virtuaty par-fri q developmenl .f g 
.UC! fo, zi y.ur. And it was only with theucl': 
^offi:jal recognition by the loc in'rg93 rhatprofessionar cycristscouldfnallf participate again in the Olympi. G"mesl the first being the1996 Garnes in Atlanta- verbruggen's .ro*. were key to the reintqration
of the ucl into the orympic ifo...-"rr, 
"rrd the concenrration of deci-sioS;makinqpowers within the UCI as the sole g"*rt";ùô. "
How did the situation unfold? In 19g4, th"îtcp ,r""rn;; new pres-ident to complete the mandate of the deceased Josy Eslh. T*o .*didates stood for election: Teï ]:rbruggen and Germain Simon (France).verbruggen was elected FICp prlident on 2g November r9g4.
Sr1 rears iater (July 1990), the ucl found itself without a president
after the death of Louis Puig (Spain). verbruggen stood for the post and
was elected on 29 November 1991 at the ucl congress in Berlin.'with
the division into three inrernational federations (FIac, FICB ucl) of
which only the FIAC was recognised by the IOC, the ucl was cleaay
not in a position ro promore the sport it represented as the international
governing body. The dissolution of the FIAC and the FICp therefore
became Hein verbruggen's first objective as the newly elected ucl
President.
ïi,'o events facilitated the unification. on the one hand, the sepere-
tion of amateurs and professionals became superfluous from a sporting
point of view due to the abolition of the amareur code (r9g1). bn the
other hand, the end of the cold \war and the demise of rhe union of
Soviet socialist Republics (ussR) in 1989 simplified the desuuction
of the "iron currain" in cycling. The path was clear for the rapproche-
ment of the FIAC and FICP blocs.'s7ith the support of Juan Antonio
Samaranch (IOC President from 1980 to 2001), Hein Verbruggen
succeeded in his first mission: in 1992, the decision to dissolve the
FIAC and FICP was passed by the UCI Congress (Orlando, USA).
The decision \ry'as finalised in August 1993, leading to the reinregra-
tion of the ucl into the olympic Movemenr in the same year. Insùad
of FIAC and FICB rwo new councils v7s1s 61s21sd-the Âmateur and
Professional councils-but these only existed for a short time. During
the 1996 UCI Congress (Lugano, 11 August), the rwo council, *.r.
abolished. The Professional council was subsequently replaced by wo
commissions: the Road Elire commission and the Road commission.
Four years later, in order to better respond to the growing popular-
iry and success of professional cycling, the ucl 
"nrro,rt.à th. .tr-ation of the Professional cycling council (pcc) at the 2000 ucl
congress (sint Michielsgestel, 28 January). This council still exists
today and is, among other things, responsible for carryingout the tech-
nical and administrative organisation of the ucl 'worldrouç draw-
ing up the 'worldTour calendar and drafting regulations specific to
ucl \Torldrour Teams. The evenrs leading to the crearion of the pcc
demonstrate the UCI's srrong focus on road cycling.
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The Creation of the proTour: A Means to Controlthe tnternational Cycling càl"nJ",
Cycling lives on th;. mfths qf sllmingfy insurmountable challengessuch as the firsr cycl.ing-race in tsgt,hm paris to Brest and backover a total of 1300 km,.mostly on rough cobbred roJ.tii." rt.rr,and because of its ootential to 
"rrr"., "rrl f"r.irr*.e people, cycling hasalways been exploii.d, bT ;fq.*", p'r.r*re groups: ,,Historically, gort
las atwary been' organised n fu*t;oÏ-of"J*"thng erse. rhh makes sportin general uery uulnerab,tr, ai1. cycling in particutar as cycling teams haueno political backins o"! rr? lintr rrglo*i embedding" (ui,"ii 2015).The creation of tli. Tou, i. Fr"".;l; ;;;:,;"u;-';_^;r::ili: instru_mentalisation of cycling by press gror.rpr, '
The creation of the Tour de France and its success
At the end of the lgth-century, Le Vélo was.the only daily sports mag!azine in France. ts chief editoi À".i.'citr"ra, ,rppoitJdrtrlj'Ër"yr*in the Drevfus affairs to.the #r;; o]r.Jna"nt of the cycring and carindustries' Nevertheress,.the cycring anJl"-i'inorrtries had gained visibil_ity through ad'ertising in *tu'riJ.tine.'," igoo, when the industriaristscreated their own daily sports *"iiiin", iÀuto_veto, prlnted on yellow
tff ?i{iïri,ifiiiiïfy.mru;;uyr;lir;g:::t.:ïr:years later and rename its magazine tÀr,io. t"t1" rJr" yËr-;;;;"*to the prorpect of rosing ."irio*.iui--rîrr.,,r,g ôppôrtuniti€is , L,Autolaunched a new strategy to increase its reaOlrsnip: organising the biggestcycling race ever s6sn::t6s rour àe rr"^â in" success of the first ïourde France (i903) afforded L'auta;-.;"til;;;re advantage over its corn-petitor and le vélo withdre* i in'"eut"1Ëà toto*ing year. The verowpaper upon which'Auro was printeà u"."-eir,À oi;iffii;;ilrrrri,n"Tour de France leader,s jersey.
Today, the mythical.T!:?". France is organised by ASO (Amaury Sportorganisation). The Tour 
1ot_only fras a tongiiaOition, it also.generaies"sig_nificant revenues. Tour de.France 
""i ;";;; in 2o14 totalled approxi_mately EUR 3s miilion 61b9t zorsl. rn lôii,"r, ,n,ttion specrators tined
l9l"11t_f:,. the stages of the Toui A" rr"i.", a totat of EUR 2.2 mittionprrze money was distributed,^^4^500 peopte iere invorved in-ilu'Jiirvorganisation of the event, 35,0@ O.i, *!.. ù""f."J UV if,l ;;n;;*A"during the Tour's three weeks, rzool"rr""'iirî, *.r" accredited and theTour was broadcasr to 195 .oln,.i"t,',Ëtilïr,*n a totâr of 3.5 birion
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spectâton worldwide.o lt is b€yond doubt that an organisation like ASO
does not need the UCI to make its economic model work. On the contrary.
the UCI has often been an unwanted presence, imposing rules on an event
that was created just three years after the UCt itself (1900), an event that
has given rise to mfths and stories of glory and defeat, and that has an
economic impact like no other cycle race in the world. So far, neither Hein
Verbruggen nor his suc(essors have managed to control ASO as much as
they would have liked. ln 2014, 56 out of 't 54 race days on the WorldTour
calendar were organised by A5O (Aubel 2015), giving the organiser con-
siderable visibility and power.
In the years following the dissolution of the FICP and the FIAC, Hein
Verbruggen concentrated his efforts on srrengthening the UCI's influ-
ence on cycling events which, up undl then, had been under the con-
trol of private commercial organisers, professionai teâms, broadcasters,
sponsors, etc. This lack of control not only weakened the UCIt deci-
sion-making role, but also its financial capacities. Verbruggen was
convinced that an IF has to control its international event calendar in
order to govern its sporr. During his time as a member of the FICB
he recognised the overwhelming power of some race organisers, notably
the "Société du Tour de France" (now known as ASO), the organiser of
the Tour de France. The international cycling calendar in this era was
literally in the hands of Félix Lévitan, Director of the Tour de France
from L962-1987: "ASO, or rather the Sport Director Felix Léuitan, took
the decisions, the UCI merely approued them without opposition, reducing
its own rights and power t0 an all-time low" (HY, November Z0l4).
Very quickly, Verbruggen realised rhat race ou/ners were rether
opposed to his vision for developing cycling. " Tlce cycling calendar wds to
70%o France, Spain, Itafu and Belgium. And these federations didnT want
to change. Euery new race that carne in wds d big rtgh4 " (HV November
2014). By introducing the ProTour as a UCl-owned circuir, he initiated
a dynamic offensive against the all-powerful race organisers. Launched
in 2005 during his last year as UCI President, rhe ProTour brought
together the 18 srrongesr cycling reâms ar the mosr popular cycle
races. Participation was no longer a question of good conracrs with the
organiser (as was previously common prâctice), but was instead based
on a reâm ranking that- had its origin in the French classification sys-
tem. Baulking against the curtailment of their so far unlimited rigirts
to choose teams and dates, a power battle arose becween ASo and the
ucl. This struggle continued even afrer rhe ucl proTour had been
launched in 2005, culminating in 2008 when ASo declared that it
would quit the ucl calendar and organise irs races independently.
Having joined forces with other major organisers such as tics (ciio
d'kalia) and unipublic (vuelta a Esparla), ASo once again demon-
strated its powerful position. In the end, the Ioc had ,o ù,"r,r.rr" 
", "mediator to break the deadlock.
. _According to Verbruggen, rhe proTour was pursuing a sraregy of sta_bilising reams' financial si'arions by guaranteeing tJp-level iarticipa-tian. "Zhe weah situation of teams was at the basis o|tti n*nu, crrati.on
because^tedms Are uery uulnerable. ve ,.,anted ,o oirn neu) sources of reu-
enues for the teams and bind sponsors uia participation guardntees," (HV
April 2015). A process of the professionalisati,on anJ globalisation of
cycle races and teams followed the creation of the prJrour (renamed
\ûorldrour in 2011). Nowadays, race organisers have to follow a precise,
very strict organisation guide, the implemenration of which is controlled
by professional ucl technical delegates. In addition, commissaires offi-
ciating at \TorldTour races are specifically trained and \forldreams, in
order to receive their licence, have ro prove their compliance with finan-
cial, ethical and sporting criteria defined by the ucl. Nevertheless,
the economy of the sysrem conrinues to be very fragile. Teams still rely
entirely on their main sponsors, rhere is no redistribution ofTV rights to
the teams and atiletes receive poor prize money compared to other top
professional sporrs such as tennis (in 20i5, number one player Novak
Djokovic earned usD 21.6 millionT in prize money alone) or golf (for
the 2015 PGAs championship, a total of usD r0 million was distrib-
uted to the top 21 players, the winner getting USD 1.8 millione). Even
for the UCI, the UCI \TorldTour has not been very profitable, some-
times even returning a deficit: in 2013, high legal costs (CHF 218,000)
and expenses for meetings (cHF 812,000) led to a \worldrour loss of
CHF 96,000 (UCI Annual Report 2OI3).In 2014, the UCI \TorldTour
generated modest revenue of CHF 240,000 (UCI Annual Report 2014).
Furthermore, cycling fans, potential sponsors and partners do not
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display much recognirion of the "ucl 'worldrour" brand whereas they
are highly aware of the three biggest races of the \forldrour: the Tour
de France, Giro d'Italia and Vuelta a Espafia.l0 The continuing reform
of men's professional road rycling, with implementation planned for
2017-2019, in conjunction with the opposition of key stakeholden
(e.g. race organisers, teams), emphasises rhe ongoing strtrggls between
the ucl as the governing body of international cycling and stakeholders'
individual needs and inrerests.
Hein Verbruggen's Achievements as UCI president
Hein verbruggen's legaq to cycling and the ucl results from a well'
thought out and well-conducted transformarion of a traditional, volun-
teer-run and slightly dusry sport federation into a dynamic, professiond
and trendsetting federarion. According to verbruggen, one of his most
important achievements is hardly menrioned: the reform of professional
riders' working conditions by introducing social protection measures
through an agreement between the ucl and economic partners (in
particular social insurence guarantees and minimum salaries for road
ryclists), signed in Lisbon on 12 October 2001. Before this, ,,ridzrs werc
slaues, orten paid in hind, not in cash. And the UCI Rubbook of a rnea.grv
seaen to eight pages didn't contain any social protection for riders," (Hv,
April 2015). Today, the major challenges of guaranteeing viable working
ggnditions for professional cyclists are still considerable as significani(budgetary) differences exisr amongsr reems and shorr-term sponsor
agreements undeniably introduce uncertainry.
Another importanr change of paradigm under Hein Verbruggen
was the creation of the ProTour (now known as the \forldrour). Even
though the ProTour didnt entirely wrest rhe overwhelming power
fr.m race organisers such as ASO, it is today a solid .o*porr.rrt àf **
international road cycling calendar, bringing together the world's best
road cycling teams and delighting millions of fans on rhe roadside
and in front of the television. critics claimed that the new series for-
mat embodies several disadvantages: teams are mainly racing for points
(as these allow them to participate in major races) and riders have to
of selÊcriticism, that his last term âs UCI President lacked the motiva-
tion with which, hitherto, he had restrucured and developed the UCI to
become one of the biggest international sport federations: "1 was fed up
arter l0years and I had to sta! anotlter 4 years because Samaranch told. me:
'You should not only build it [World Cycling CentreJ, but you should also
run it.'And that was just 4 years too much. I didnT do the job at the leael as
I did before because rryt rnztiuation was gone," (HV November 2014).
Hein Verbruggen retired as UCI President in2005, becoming a UCI
Honorary President and co-opted member of the UCI Management
Committee until 2008. The move to become a co-opted member was
unusual for an honorary president as the latter role rypically meâns
quitting all executiye functions. Some interpreted this situation
as Verbruggen's desire to cling on to power. But it was also a tactical
move undertaken in light of his ambitions regarding the IOC. Hein
Verbruggen became an IOC member in 1996. To remain an IOC
member and continue his work on the Coordination Commission for the
Games of the ÆIX Olympiad in Beijing in 2008 (200i-2008), to which
he had been elected as Chairman in November 2001, he had to occupy
an executive function within an IF. And the UCI Constitution offered
a solution: according to Article 47, the UCI Management Committee,
comprising 15 members at this time, could co-opt two additional mem-
bers. Verbruggen wes co-opted as a member of the UCI Management
Committee in 2005, immediately after the election of his successor Pat
McQuaid. He was also named UCI Vce-President of International
Relations due to his numerous contâcts with, and functions within, the
IOC (President, Chairman and acdve member of various commissions),
SportAccord (President from 2O04-2013) and ASOIE the Association
of Summer Olympic International Federations (Vice-President from
2000-2003).
GAISF/SportAccord
Under the Presidenry of Verbruggen the organisation has been able to
move forward in a way that perhaps would not have been possible under
any other President. (former SportAccord staff member, March 201 3)
Though Hein Verbruggen relinquished his function as UCI President
in 2005, it was clearly nor to take a break or retire from international
sports. In 20O4, as GAISF Vice-Presidenr, he replaced Un-Yong Kim
to become acting President. Kim was forced to resign over allegations
of bribery and illegally acquiring public money intended for the 'World
Tâelcwondo Federation (\7TF) over which he presided. After three years
as acting President, \èrbruggen was officially elected GAISF President
in 2007. Established in 1967, GAISF represenrs all IFs. Howeveç its
role as a link between iFs and the IOC and as a platform for exchange
and the defence of IFs'common interesrs dates back to the 1920s.
The collective reprcsentation of lnternational Sport Federations
Through the Conse/ National des Sporr (CNS), which brought together
the leaders of the principal sport federations, France actively organised a
coumer-power to the IOC by promoting initiatives to orgenise collective
world championships. ln 1918, th€ CNS established the conditions for the
creation of international groups, the equivalent of today's lFs. This project
could have resulted in France assuming a hegemoni< position within each
lF and in a Comité lnternational des Sporf (ClS). Aware of the threat to the
Olympic movemen! Pierre de Coubertin, with the help of some interna-
tional leaders and IOC members, interrupted this attempt. As an ahernative
he established a Permanent Office of lntërnational Sporb Federatians in
1921, with headquarters in Paris (Grosset and Attali 2009). The office orEan-
ised regular me€tings betureen Olyrnpic federations and the lOC, facilitat-
ing dialogue. However, non-Olympic federations were excluded. Having no
representation vis-à-vis the IOC and rlo platform for exchange between fed-
erations to defend their common interests, 26 federations câme together
in Lausanne in 1967 to create the Genera/ Assembly of lnitemational
Spor6 Federafibns, replacing the Permanent Office of lnternational Sports
Federations. The Assembly was rebranded the General Associatian af
lntemational Sporb Federaubns (G,4|SF) in 1976 and became SportAccord in
2009. ln April 2017, it was renamed the Globa/ Association of lnternatianal
Sports Federafions, hence adopting its former acronym GA|SF.
Hein Verbruggen became a leading figure in international sport through
his position at GAISF. However, he came close to turning his back on
GAISF in 2004: " GAISF didnT do anlthing. Nothing. IVe had two rneet-
ings per lear that neuer lasted longer than 59 minutes. I was wonder-
ing what I was doing tlteref' (HV November 2014). The inactivity of
99b t.<I O
-.: HIJ. ÊËÉià F
: Ë T 3ËHÈ\
.i.i^
oI È E sEX'ù.g b
. Y 8 *.FËËT5s
t.r-'v
CO \_J i.i r. i-
.oo sF
-lJ tsi c/) Eb sS'E.gUË . ^ +É€E?g
 GUAAV'rY{l
^u^'-vrn?d!!
",-O H UÏi
FÉôE g
a,)-d U- ):
fËEËE(/) X H'Ë qH*'!H
<r o.a H
u d 3 bË
^Aù-o\-d OË c-.ô-: oo âoHg.9.È(*.l L d o.d
s $;Égq€O€
qPX5 É oi^ 9j.945 it q FË 3FflËL. ^o,F Xr^o 
'!:;çE i g !;Ë Ë gÊ.ëo S9ç ËO. oq 
= 
ôttt xo 91?&.v
:J 4*Ê ais:
Ouqre*
ùÀde'+, ai-Ei-(R--ûPC FÛts6È ËËPE
F ci^e X F
VHÊ!
LgHÊi i ga:Ë 
-ir s+g ëHfiEÂ- 8..- !.-:
--ivd, ioâXUBrÊù'i ÉËjË-
o 9 E o ôJttt r: -9 o" o
-- 
* 
-"--b,-ruvv 
'ù vu\rrr'_/1,5socrauon or i(ecognlsed lnternational
-sp9* Federations) and non-recognised IFs rÀirr,s-ÀiL* of
fndef;nden1. Recognised Members 
-of Spon;. Ail eïe members ofsportAccord/GAlsE For.a non--recognised IF to be ,..ognir"a, ,t e feder-
ation has to fulfil a number of critùa. officially, ,h" d;;;; ,..og'ir.an IF lies with the ioc. But as rhe federation first has to be a member ofSportAccord/GAISE the initial due diligence of veri$,ing *h.À.; ,lre IF isin compliance with Ioc criteria fails ; sportAccord/GAlsF. This makes
sportAccord/GAlsF an important piilar of the loc's recognition foficy.
. 
Over the years, IFs' efforts ro become recognised plr.d 
" 
,r.* butbasic question: what is a sport? Under Verbrug!"n, Sporra.*à 
"r,"b-lished a set of criteria to define what a sporr is, a task that not even theIOC has ever undertaken. The full list of criteria is given below:
SportAccord Convention
' In an environment where samaranch was pursuing maximum controlover the IFs and where GAISF president Kim sought to increase hisown influence within the IOC, even if thisJJ;r#;.ririg rugg.*ion,and initiarives from IFs, new ,rrd innorr"tive ideas *.r" ,rî, a priorityfor GA'SF. But this did not ;;;;;r"ggen trying. As the ioC hasro meer its four associations (i... aSOfd"afOWp,.azuSf, affras) .,least once e yeer, he suggested_ organising an annuar meeting over sev-eral days, bringing 
.og.rh", all IF"s. Thus the idea of the SfortAccordConvention *as born. Despite ,lr. ,,r...rr'rJ ;; ;**rllio' or rn.sportAccord convenrion in 2003, Kim continued to ,iehemently rejectVerbruggent initiative, al*ort-.",rrirg him to give up. But with Kim,sforced departure in 20.04, th. sporJtord conr,.ntion rosr its harshesrcritic and verbruggen. became. acting GAISF president i, ,t.-rr-. y."r.Emphasising the signifi cance he nrrigrr"d rt . SporJ..ori^èorrrr".r,ior,,uttotï*-*:r. r.-pidli-ï1ated 
" 
*p"i*-srrucrure for the convenrion,owned 500/o bv cArsr, 300/o bv ASOrF and zoù ai- aôiir. s,n.*2003, the SportAccord Corrr,.rrtio' t"r-U..r, an annual must for IFs.over several days, it brings ag.rr*t-"Lout 2000 deregates, key deci-sion-makers from sport go"rr.rnirrg b.dies. and the sporrs industry. Itconsdtutes a platform,for".orr.r..f;"g, 
.;.h""g.ng knowledge and par-ticipating in shaping the world of irit.rnational sport. Today, revenuesfrom the SportAccord Convention ,.pr.r.r* th. 
_ort i_p.ri"r, sourceof GAISF income.
,, T.tn_Vrrbruggen *.g31d i:*." ", SportAccord president in 2013.under Marius vizer, iiein v.rbruffi's successor at the head ofsportAccord, rhe convention was ,.bîInd.d as sportAccord conuentionwrld sport (v Business summit, thus accentuating vizer,s goar of fur-ther converging the worrd or rpor, 
"rrili.-. ,""rra of business. However,his idea of orsanising joint \forld Championships every four yearsdid not ,ecei.rrl a favourabl" ,.rporr"-fro- ,h. IOC. Joint .V'.orldChampionships would s19ngly.*;;i. ,t. Oty*pic Games, with thedifference that at rFs, orvriii. 
'. """-ôrr-;;,'iôèîffiir.a o,li1 *ïld participate. For rhe first time since 2003, and as the resultot growing discrepancies between vizer's objectives ;"J;h; iôc, ,t.
List of criteria to define what is a sport
t "Th: sport praposed shoutd incrude an erement of competition,, (thusexcluding e.g. yoga or pilates).
' "The sport shourd not rery an any erement of ,tuck' specificaryintegrated inta the sport'. (such 
", 
u.g. frori" racing)^
' 'The sport shourd not be judged to"poi-in undue risk ta the hearthand safety of its athletes,ar participaÀ*" (such as 
" 
S t"i_;;pi;Si'
" "The sport Noposed,.should-.in'n" *)y-Lu harmful ta any livingcreature" (thus excluding e.g. fishing).n The sport should not ràty àn equifment that is provided by a singtesupplier.
To be recognised by the loc, IFs further need to prove the existence ofan anti-doping poliry compriant with the \k\DA'cod., Çl"rry *"g.\7orld and contin.ntd championships, exhibit irrd.p..rl-"rrt govern-
ance sffuctures and "the sport it gnnis must be prartirrd and oiganisedin rnore than 50 countries worrdraide".r2 Even tho,rgh IFs' recognitionby the Ioc is officially governed by the orympic"clr"ri., (nrt., zoand27), the actual .'n"luaiion is conàucted ui spor.a."oJ7cÂsp. n.IOC, on the other hand, through its ,,Eualu'nrlàn ,,rlrrn) jr'Çrn, *ddisciplines", carries our an assessment of the contribution, ofbtyr,,pi.IFs to the overall success 
-of 
the olympic Games (number of tickets sord,
number of spectators, TV audien.é, .à.).
Ioc did not hold an Executive Board meeting at the 20L5 sportAccord
convention (sochi). The subliminal conflict ben'een the Ioc and
SportAccord exploded into a crisis when, in his opening speech and
in the presence of IOC President Thomas Bach, Marius Vizer openly
decried the IOC as being "exltired, outdated, wrong, unfair and not at
all nangarmt".r3 lackine the support of its members (20 SponAccord
members cut ties or suspended membership in the aftermath of the
20L5 Convention), Vizer ultimately stepped down from his position
as sportAccord President in May 20i5. Since this time, sportAccord's
structure has been considerably reduced and the organisation of
multi-sport games entirely.
SportAccord: Organiser of Global Multi-Sport Games
Supporting IFs to professionalise against a background of growing
external expectation and financial pressures was Hein verbruggen's first
objective upon becoming GAISF President. Affording IFs, in particular
small IFs, a cerrain visibiliry was another. The Olympic Games âre one
of the world's most important international sport events. At the time of
writing this chapter, 35 of the 92IFs that are full members of GAISF
T. or the Olympic progremme (28 summer +7 winter). Recognising
the potential of the 57 sports thar are nor, and perhaps never will be,
on the Olympic progremme, Verbruggen had the idea of grouping
sports together ro organise multi-sport gemes: "Arnongst the 92 fedna-
tions I had 14 or 15 rnartial arts. So I had Martial Arts Games. I had 4
or 5 fedtrations that were mind garnes, bridge, chess and so on. So f cre-
ated the Mind Ga.mes," (HV November 2014). Thanls to Verbruggent
close relationship wirh Jacques Rogge (IOC President 2001-2013), the
IOC supported the idea at the time. The economic model of the mul-
ti-sport gemes was similar to the Olympic Games: SportAccord owned
the rights and appointed a local organiser who paid an organising fee
(approximately CHF 3 million for the Martial fut Games and CHF
1.2 million for the Mind Games). sportAccord coordinated the devel-
opment of the gâmes together with its member IFs. under the auspices
of SportAccord, the SportAccord multi-sport gâmes gave non-Olympic
sports and disciplines worldwide exposure. Since 2010, two \florld
Combat Games (2010 in Beijing 2013 in St. Petersburg) and four
I7orld Mind Games (2011-2014 in Beijing) have taken place. The first
edition of the -S(i'orld Urban Games were scheduled for 2016 and the
I7orld Beach Games for 2017. However, nor everyone welcomed this
evolution: "Sorne peopli in the IOC wondered if it wa.s the rolz of inter-
national sport federations to organise galnes," (HV Norrember 20i4).
The concept of SportAccord multi-sporrs games ground to a sud-
den halt with Marius Vizer's opening speech at the 2015 SportAccord
Convention and his replacement as SportAccord President shordy after.
Verbruggen insisted that, under his presidency SporrAccord was not
seeking to rival the Olympic Games, nor rvas it meant to be a coun-
ter-power to the IOC. He considered SportAccord primarily as a service
provider to the IFs and the multi-sporr games as a means of affording
visibility to IFs that will perhaps never be included on the Olympic
Programme. \fhile his goal for SportAccord was to be financially
independent of the IOC through the organisation of, the SportAccord
Convention and the multi-sport gemes, he recognised the need to work
closely with the IOC for the benefit of the federations: " If you want
to be a seraice o?erd.tor to the fedzrations, if you tuant to do something for
them, you can't do it without the IOC, without a close cooperdtion between
SportAccord and the IOC," (HV May 2015).The immediate dropping
of multi-sport games and other services (except anti-doping) and the
return to its former acronym (GAISF) in 2017 under the new president
demonstrate the current priorities of GAISF: maximum alignment with
IOC requirements and minimum conflict, even if this means diminish-
ing services to IFs.
Allegations Against Hein Verbruggen
\(z'hile his time as UCI President passed generally uncontested and
was rather evaluated in relation to the UCI's growing prosperity and
structure, rumours and allegations came to the surface after Hein
Verbruggen relinquished the UCI presidenry in 2005.In 2008, a BBC
investigation into UCI Ênances pointed a finger at payments made
rr esyrç
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governed the ucl *t]h 
".srrong executive power, himself overseeinginrernal, external and political issues and ^taking decisions ,,armost
unchallenget'.'7 A.nd he knew how to deploy his ciarm 
"rJ .rr. *gr-menrs ro get people ro act as he desired.
All these allegations^underline the picture of Hein verbruggen as
a highly conrroversial figure. A lot of people who worked with him
describe him as a charismatic, professiùd and tireless visionary who
transformed the ucl, int^ernationar cycring and sport in generi: ,,Not
many lt1d"the capacities of Hein wrbruggei to rnandge poritics and busi-
ness' He ltas an exceptional 
.capacity to-àpproach pt;ptt and arutays fndsupporf' (former UCI employee, March 2015). MËanwhile, his oppo_
nents,_including former ryclists and reading administrator" ir, ry.lirrg(e.g' former ucl president Brian cooksJn) nnd 
"rrtl-aofirrg (..g.Richard Pound), criticised him repeatedly for his managem"rrirryt" 
"rialleged wrongdoings related to doping pi".ti.es in cyclirg. This chapter
has no intention of taking.l poririoi regarding thé 
"bulrr. 
allegations.
Meanwhile, with doping dlegations being a Jominant and recurring
topic in the last years of verbruggen's rife, the folrowing section suæesrs
an alternative view of dgrins ba".d on the general peËeption and evo-lution of; and modves fot, th. fight againstioping in sport. vhile the
issues of the perception and evolution of the hgh"t 
"girrrt doping areperhaps less publicly discussed, they strongly irti',r"rr.i the current dis-
course on doping in cycling.
An Alternative perspective on Doping
At. the beginning of the twentieth century, the use of performance-
enhancing drugs was more often considered a scientific'miracle than
an immoral, fraudulenr or even hearth-threatening practice. It was
only in the 1960s that a number of interrelat.d ,,i*o,r^ and evenrs
lts*.to change the perception of doping. A first rumour theorised
tÀat,- during world \Var II, German ,oldi"r, were given steroid.s ro cre-
ate " ltylier-masculinised, uhra-agressiue cornbat soîdierr,, (Beamish andRitchie 2005)' The second trÀà,rt was that athletes from communist
countries had been consciously given steroids during the cord \Var to
boost performance in international sporting competitions and hence
symbolically emphasise the power of the Easrern Bloc. The spectacular
success of Eastern Bloc athletes rogerher with a growing awareness of
the health risfts of using performance-enhancing drugs led to a change
in the perception of doping. And with the death of Tom Simpson on
Mont Ventoux in fronr of spectators and the TV audience, doping sud-
denly also had a face in rycling. Simpson died on 13 July 1967 from
a combination of amphetamines (found in his jersey pocket), immense
physical effort and heat. He has since become t}re emblematic figure of
doping in cycling.
In the following years, doping bans were, above all, dominated by
considerations about the riders' health. However, it wasnt until the
1990s with the rise of EPO and the Festina Affair that doping was
considered morally unacceptable. 'Sfhile for decades conventionâl dop-
ing and its relatively predictable impact on performance seemed ro be
widely accepted among ryclists, rhe emergence of EPO unhinged the
entire system. The performance increase through EPO was without
precedent. Cyclists were alarmed as an equality of opportuniry was no
longer a question of chemical substances but of sophisticated, expensive
medical procedures. In 1995, the UCI, under the presidency of Hein
Verbruggen, commissioned a Lausanne-based laborarory ro develop a
procedure to detect EPO. But even this could not prevent the negative
effects that the Festina Affair would have on the perception of cycling.
The image of a sport engrained with doping persists to this day as much
as the question of who is to blame.
As described above, the perception of doping has changed over the
decades: from first being considered as a scientific achievemenr, then
as a health-threatening product and finally as a morally illicit prac-
tice. Today, and more than in any orher sporr, the fight against dop-
ing in cycling seems to be exploited not only for moral argumenrs
but also as a political tool under the guise of which individuals or
groups of individuals pursue personal interesrs. 'With the general
commercialisation of sporr since the 1980s (Robinson 2003), there
is more than just the practice of sport and the athletes themselves
at stake. As the market value of sport hâs grown, so have the inter-
ests and investments of various actors including the media, sponsors
and sport officials. In this context, doping represents an economic
threat to sports in general and a detriment to the image of interna-
tional sport federations in particular. Perhaps the imporrant ques-
tion is not "Whose faub ls doping in cycling?" brt "What dimensions
other than moral principles should/could be taken i.nto consideration in
the fgbt against àoping?" How about ecrors' economic motives (e.g.
threat of losing sponsorship money because of doping scandals) and
key individuals' political objectives (e.g. election campaigns in which
the fight against doping sells well)? To this we can also add Aubelb
(2013) sociological perspective, which focuses on cyclists' working
environments (e.g. team structure, functional and economic model,
physical preperâtion conditions and the employment framework
offered to riders) and the question of elements that trigger doping
practices and how the working environment should be modelled to
prevent them.
A recent paper by Kayser and Tolleneer (2017) in the Journal of
Medical Ethics discusses yet another interesting perspective. It picla
up on the debate of two diametrically opposed discourses on ethics
and doping. The first discourse "defend^s strict prohibition enforced by
suraeillance and punitiue rEression" (p. 1), but is practically impossi-
ble to meet in terms of technology and surveillance; the second"fnds
anti-doping illogical and callsfor the liberalisation of dopiog" (p. 1), but
is likely to encourage excessive drug use by some athletes. Thus consid-
ering both discourses as non-realisable idealistic goals and raising the
question of the possible aggrevating effects of anti-doping policies, the
authors adopt a systemic analysis to debate ethical aspects of relaxed
anti-doping rules accompanied by harm-reduction measures. Kayser
and Tolleneer acknowledge the incompleteness of their analysis (e.g.
not taking athletes' decision-making capacities into eccounr). However,
their critical questions on the ethics of doping, situated at the interface
of two extreme discourses, put forward the experimentd dimension of
their idea, rather than moralising a topic with an immensely complex
and ambivalent past (scientific miracle, superhuman strength, humans
es wâr machines) and the current problem of assessing often intangi-
ble parameters including "limits to testing technology and suraeillance
drnsity" (p. 1).
Conclusion
Hein Verbruggen undeniably divides opinions; he has as many supporr-
ers as opponents. Verbruggen has been celebrated as the person who
made the UCI a successfirl, professional IF. Yet he has been attacked rÀ/irh
serious allegations regarding his leadership style and approach to the
fight against doping. The aim of this chapter is not to provide a com-
plete picture of Hein Verbruggen as a person or comment on the differ-
ent allegations, but rather to identify his impact on the organisational
and functional structure of sport organisations during his time at the
UCI and SportAccord/GAISF as well as his ability to implement cor-
porâte principles in sport organisations and to explore new ideas. His
legaq is wofold: with regard to his time as UCI President, Verbruggen
professionalised the administrative strucrure. He also triggered globali-
sation and the worldwide marketing of cycling by concentrating regula-
tory po\Mer in the UCL "He came fom business and it is his achieuement
thdt cycling profesionaliset' (former UCI employee, March 2015). Hein
Verbruggen had a vision and his pragmatic, charismatic management
became the guarantor of this vision. At the same rime, critics reproach
him for a failure to effectively combat cyding's internal ethical problems,
such as widespread, organised doping practices and the associated dangers
(athletes' health, fair-play, sporring ethics, etc.), in order to favour the
sporting spectacle and financial profits and to create mythical champions
such as Lance Armstrong. The image of Hein Verbruggen as a powerfirl,
dmost invincible president evokes other strong leaders from the same
period such as Primo Nebiolo (International Association of Athledcs
Federations-IAAF President from 1981 until his death in 1999), Ruben
Acosta (Fédération Internationale de Volleyball-FlvB President from
1984 to 2008) or Sepp Blatter (FIFA President from 1998 to 20L5).
These federations (UCI, IAAF, FIVB, FIFA) have in common that they
were all coordinated by suong executive presidents who were commiued
to capialising on sporting events, hence laying the foundation for the
commercialisation of their federations. Hein Verbrugen was a guiding
hand as President of the UCI and SportAccord/GAISE surounded b;'
capable helpers thanks to his "fne sense for people, their motiuation and
their competencies" (former UCI staffmember,2005). Many who workd
closely with him over the years described him as a rirelessly dedicated
visionary, a good listener, always available, a perfectionist. His opponenrs
1*yr. him of corruption and aurocraric management. Hein verbruggen
died on 14 June 2017 at the age of 75.
Notes
1. Jean-Marie Leblanc, former Tour de France Director, about Hein
Verbruggen in 2005. Source: "Le presid.ent", a book offered to Hein
Verbruggen by the UCI at the end of his preside ncy in 2005.
2. source: http: //www. theguardian. com/spon/20 1 2 I o ctl 24 I frorenzo-magni.
3. Source: 1964 Olympic Charter Eligibility Rules of the IOC.
4. Source: Minutes of the 63rd meeting of the IOC.
5. Dreyfus affair: in 1894, French artillery officer Alfred Dreyfus was
accused of revealing French military secrers to the German Embassy in
Paris. Two years larer, investigarions by the counter-espionage service
found evidence of Dreyfus' innocence. Howeve! instead of admiuing
a judicial error, the army used falsified documents ro accuse Dreyfus
of additional charges. under the pressure of activists (e.g.ÉimilezaLa),
the affair became a polidcal and judicial scandal, dividing French
society into supporters of Dreyfus and those who condemned him.
Accusations against Dreyfus were Ênally found to be baseless and he
was exonerared in 1906.
6. source: http://lifestyle.boursorama.com/article/le-tour-de-&ance-en-dix-
chiffres-insolites_a828l I .
7. Source: www.atpworldtour.com/enimedia/rankings-and-stats.
8. PGA: Professional Golfers' Association.
9. Source: http://www.cbssports.com/golf/news/20 1 5-pga-championship-
prize-mo ney-every-golfers-payo ut-from- I 0m-pool/.
10. source: http://www.cyclingnews.com/fearures/opinion-the-uci-worldtour-
is-a-failing-brand.
11. sourcq official Report of the Games of the )oollrd olympiad Los
Angeles, 1984.
12. Source: http://www.arisf.org/ 1 4-uncategorised/30-ioc-recognition.
13. source: http://playthegame.org/news/news-articlesl2015l0044-sport-
accord-president-vizer-steps-down-aft er-row-with-ioc/.
14. source: http://www.playthegame.org/news/news-articles/2008/cycling-
event-alleged-to-have-bo ught-olymp ic-accep tance-from- uci/.
1 5. Source: http : //www. insidethegames. bizlindex. php/articles/ I 037 B8g I
former-uci-preside nt-verbruggen-wins-defamation-case-against-journal-
ist-kimmage-in-swiss-courts.
16. Source: CIRCReport20l5_Neutral.pd[ p. 8.
17. Idem.
Bibliography
Literature
Amis, John, Ti:evor Slack, and Christopher R. Hinings. 2004. Strategic Change
and the Role of Inreresrs, Power, and Organizational Capacity. Journal of
Sport Management 18 (2): 158-198.
Aubel, Olivier.20l3. Trois propositions pour changer la culture du
cycliste professionnel. Une politique rénovée de prévention du dopage.
schuteizerische zeitschrifi Fùr sportmedizin [Jnd sporttraumatohsie Gr (3):
34-38.
Aubel, Olivier. 2075, Prêcerité économique et dérive des comportemenrs:
I'oremple du dopage dans le cyclisme. Le journal de I'école de paris du man-
agernent 111(1):3844.
Barbusse, Béatrice. 2002. Sport et entreprise: des logiques convergentes?
LAnnée sociologique 52 (2) : 39 l4I 5.
Bayie, Emmanuel, Jean-Loup Chappelet, Aurélien François, and Lionel
Maltèse. 2011. Sport et RSE. Wrs un rnanagelnent responsabh? Bruxelles:
De Boeck Editions.
Beamish, Rob, and Ian Rirchie. 2005. the Spectre of Steroids: Nazi
Propaganda, Cold 'S7ar Anxiery and Patriarchai Paternalism. The
IntemationalJoarnal of the History of Sport22 (5):777-795.
Chappelet, Jean-Loup. 199I. Le système ofurnpique. Grenoble, France: Presses
Universitaires de Grenoble.
Chappelet, Jean-Loup. 2008. International Olynpic Committee and the Olympic
Systern: Zhe Gouernance ofVorld Sport. .ilbingdon: Roudedge.
Chappelet, Jean-Loup, and Brenda Kûbler-Mabbott. 2008. International
Olympic Committee and the Olympic System (IOC): Tbe Gouernance of\yorld
Sport. London: Routledge.
de coubertin, Pierre. 1888. L'éducation en Angleterre. paris: collèges et
Universités.
de coubertin, Pierre. 1890. (Jniuersités transatlantiques.paris: Hachette.
Grosser, Yoan, and Michaël Attdi. 2009. The French Initiative Towards the
creation of an International sports Movement 1908-1925: An Alternative
to the International olympic committee. Journal of sport History 36 (2):
245.
Hoye, Russell, and Sue Inglis. 2003. Governance of Nonprofit Leisure
Organizations. Loisir et Société/Society and. Leisure 2G (Z): 369-397.
Kayser, Bengt, and Jan Tolleneer. 2012. Ethics of a Relaxed Antidoping Rule
Accompanied by Harm-Reduction Measures. Journal of Medical Ethics
43 (5):282-286.
Robinson, Leigh. 2003. The Business of sport. rn sport (r society: A studcnt
Introduction, ed. B. Houlihan, 165-183. London: Sage.
